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Mandatory Reassignment as a 
Reasonable Accommodation Under the 




Imagine an employer is hiring for a position requiring 
three years of experience. The employer is choosing between two 
applicants within its company: one who is highly qualified and 
has over fifteen years of experience, and the other who is less 
qualified and has only three years of experience. Although both 
meet the necessary qualifications, an employer will likely choose 
the more-qualified applicant. The decision to hire the more 
qualified candidate, however, can be complicated and may not 
even be permissible if the less-qualified applicant manifests a 
disability.2 This is because the employer is required to comply 
with the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which contains 
an ambiguous provision that allows for employee reassignment 
as a mandatory reasonable accommodation.3 The ADA is 
designed to prevent discrimination and to preserve the integrity 
of an employer’s hiring system when an employee becomes 
disabled.4 However, Congress lists suggestions for reasonable 
accommodations an employer may utilize but it is unclear if 
reassignment is mandatory.5 Employment agencies and courts 
have interpreted the ambiguous provision differently, which has 
 
 1 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 
1346 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terrell v. Usair, 132 
F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 2 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A), 12111(9)(B), (2012); Richard Meneghello, 
Fisher Phillips, Court: Employees Seeking Accommodation Must Compete for 
Reassignment—Split in the Circuits Could Lead to Supreme Court Intervention, 
JDSUPRA (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/court-employees-seeking-
accommodation-74575/ [https://perma.cc/S746-B7YR]. 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 
 4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A); see also St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1345. 
 5 See infra Section I.C. 
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led to different interpretations and a lack of a consistent 
standard.6 This is precisely the issue at hand: to which 
interpretation should the employer adhere, mandatory 
reassignment or not? 
The problem lies in the interpretation of the ADA’s 
provision that suggests reassignment “may” be a reasonable 
accommodation.7 The statute’s provision containing the word 
“may”8 creates confusion over whether reassignment is always 
reasonable.9 Reasonable accommodation in the ADA refers to any 
accommodation required for an employee with a disability to 
equalize success and opportunity in the workplace.10 The United 
States Supreme Court attempted to provide a framework for 
interpreting the term “reasonableness” regarding reassignment as 
a reasonable accommodation in Barnett.11 Absent special 
circumstances, employer compliance for reassignment offered as a 
reasonable accommodation is not required to comply with the ADA 
if such a reassignment violates the company’s existing seniority 
rules.12 This framework was narrowly extended to reassignment 
cases that violated a disability-neutral rule13 categorically with 
respect to seniority systems.14 The standard is subjective and 
creates even more uncertainty regarding how employers not 
using a seniority system should comply with the ADA.15 
Hence, when confronted with the question of whether 
reassignment is mandatory outside the seniority system, circuit 
courts have issued contradictory rulings.16 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) contend 
that reassignment is always a required reasonable accommodation 
 
 6 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 7 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1345. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 10 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA 
NO. 10, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AFTER BARNETT 5 (2003). 
 11 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 12 Id. at 406.  
The typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by creating, 
and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment. These benefits 
include job security and an opportunity for steady and predictable 
advancement based on objective standards. . . . [T]o require the typical 
employer to show more than the existence of a seniority system might well 
undermine the employees’ expectations. 
Id. at 404. 
 13 A disability-neutral rule is one that “seeks only ‘equal treatment’” regardless 
of a disability, such as a seniority system. Id. at 397. 
 14 Id. at 402–06. 
 15 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10. 
 16 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
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regardless of who is the most-qualified applicant.17 These circuits 
support the proposition that reassigning a disabled employee must 
always bypass the best-qualified application process in order to 
comply with the ADA.18 By contrast, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits concluded that disabled 
employees applying for reassignment are required to compete in 
the application process and should not be given priority over more 
qualified applicants due to their disability status.19 
On December 15, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit further 
polarized the positions by rejecting the mandatory position 
adopted by the Tenth and D.C. Circuits, and adopting the position 
of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits.20 The Eleventh Circuit correctly 
argues that mandatory reassignment creates uncertainty and 
unfairness.21 Mandating reassignment would require employers 
to sacrifice more qualified employees at the expense of less 
qualified employees to satisfy the ADA, negatively impacting 
business efficacy and profit.22 To justify abandoning the 
mandatory reassignment position, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned 
that the best-qualified applicant process emulates the seniority 
system in Barnett, because it functions as a disability-neutral 
rule.23 This justification seems to suggest that the decision 
rendered in Barnett extends beyond the scope of seniority systems 
and can be extrapolated to all similar decisions.24 
Consequently, the split is widening, and employers are left 
with little guidance on how to comply with the ADA regarding 
employee reassignment.25 This note argues that the best way to 
appease all circuit courts and the contentions of the EEOC is 
through a two-prong test addressing: (1) the qualification of the 
applicant; and (2) a cost-benefit analysis that will outline some of 
the factors that the Court should consider.26 The Supreme Court 
should use this two-prong test because it will bind all the circuit 
courts to one interpretation and illuminate the compliance issues 
for employers while taking into consideration the rights owed to 
employees with disabilities under the ADA. Additionally, the two-
 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Patrick Dorrian, Disabled Workers Must Compete for Job Reassignments, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.bna.com/disabled-workers-compete-n730
14448413/ [https://perma.cc/9D8G-445C]. 
 20 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 
1345. (11th Cir. 2016). 
 21 See id. at 1345–46. 
 22 Id. at 1346. 
 23 Id. at 1346; see also U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397–98 (2002). 
 24 St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346. 
 25 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 26 See infra Part V. 
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prong test will preserve the goals of businesses while 
simultaneously safeguarding individuals with disabilities. In 
order for employers to comply with the ADA,27 there must be a 
unifying standard28 to interpret ambiguous components of the 
statute, specifically, whether reassignment as a reasonable 
accommodation is mandatory or not. 
Part I of this note addresses the history and purpose of 
the ADA, and explains the reasonable accommodation 
safeguards for disabled employees. Part II discusses the 
foundational Supreme Court case, Barnett, regarding the 
dubious standard the Court articulated, as well as the 
concurring and dissenting arguments. Part III details the circuit 
split regarding the differing interpretations of mandatory 
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation outlined in the 
ADA, and addresses the impact of the Eleventh Circuit’s most 
recent decision. Part IV explains the impact of the circuit split 
on employers and workers with disabilities. Part V evaluates 
possible solutions to the split, addresses potential problems with 
the recommended solution, and suggests that the Supreme 
Court interpret the reasonableness of mandatory reassignment 
through a two-prong test using factors regarding the 
qualification and severity of the employee’s disability as well as 
the impact to the employer. This note concludes that the most 
effective interpretation of the ADA is through a uniform 
approach for the future to bind all circuit courts and ensure 
compliance with the ADA. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON ADA SAFEGUARDS FOR 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
A. Purpose and Creation of the ADA and EEOC 
The unemployment rate for individuals with disabilities is 
eight percent, which is nearly double the rate of non-disabled 
workers.29 To help mitigate this disparity, Congress passed the 
Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990 to protect individuals with 
disabilities from discrimination in employment, education, and 
public accommodations.30 Title I of the ADA states, “no covered 
 
 27 Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 28 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 29 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU LAB. STAT.: ECON. NEWS RELEASE, USDL-19-
0326, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS—2018 (2019) https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4E6-Q6JR]. 
 30 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)); see also What Is the Americans with 
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entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis 
of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee, compensation, 
[or] job training,”31 which applies to employers with fifteen or more 
employees.32 To enforce the employment non-discrimination 
compliance provision of the ADA, Congress extended the authority 
of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC).33 Before determining if discrimination took place, a 
plaintiff must actually meet the definition of disability.34 
B. Meeting the Definition of “Disability” 
Section 12102 of the ADA defines “disability” as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities.”35 A disability that falls within the 
ADA cannot be minor, but rather, it must “substantially limit”36 
the individual’s ability to perform his or her job.37 The term 
“substantially limits” means the disabled employee can no 
longer complete a major life activity or is severely restricted in 
performing a major life activity compared to an average person.38 
This interpretation is read in accordance with the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, which Congress passed to restore the 
goals and purpose of the original ADA of 1990 by loosening the 
threshold to increase coverage.39 
 
Disabilities Act (ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, https://adata.org/learn-about-ada 
[https://perma.cc/E4ZD-F2PZ]. 
 31 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 32 Id. § 12111(5)(A) (2012) (“‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees”). 
 33 Id. § 12117; U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/V8RG-BDKC]. 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); The EEOC investigates allegations of 
discrimination against employers. In order to prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must 
prove a prima facie case that: (1) the individual has a disability; (2) the individual is 
qualified for the job; and (3) an adverse employment decision was made because of the 
individual’s disability. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 
F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). This section further suggests a non-
exhaustive list of such major life activities and major bodily functions. Id. § 12102(2). 
 36 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2018). 
 37 See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 237–39 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding a hearing 
impairment did not constitute as a substantial impairment because there were mitigating 
devices used to lessen the impact of the disability). 
 38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2018). 
 39 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012)) (“Congress finds that the current 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term 
‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional 
intent, by expressing too high of a standard.”). 
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Additionally, the EEOC interprets substantially limited 
as “an impairment [that] disqualifies an individual from a 
significant number of jobs for which the person would otherwise 
be qualified.”40 Thus, the term substantially limited does not 
extend to those individuals who are unable to perform a one job 
but rather encompasses those individuals, with respectively the 
same skills and training as an average person, who have a 
reduced ability to perform a wide range of jobs.41 The United 
States Supreme Court initially ruled that an individual is not 
substantially limited and thus does not meet the definition of 
manifesting a disability if the individual has the ability to control 
his or her condition.42 Under the original interpretation, the 
burden posed on a diabetic taking insulin is much higher than an 
individual without the benefit of medicine or assistance, and thus 
would not qualify as an individual with a disability.43 
Congress changed this mitigation interpretation when it 
passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.44 Under this version, 
Congress decided that the Court’s determination was “an unduly 
restrictive view of what constitutes as substantial limitation,”45 
uncoupling the interpretation by assessing the status of the 
individual without the use of the necessary assistance to 
function normally.46 Congress reinterpreted the Court’s 
construction by classifying the individual as disabled although 
the individual maintains a method of controlling the disability.47 
Thus, an individual with diabetes prescribed insulin to control 
the disability now has a chance to qualify as disabled under the 
ADA, as a disability determination does not follow from merely 
having a diagnosis.48 For instance, a temporarily disabled 
individual with a broken arm would not qualify under the 
“disability” definition under the ADA because this disability is 
 
 40 John E. Murray, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Redefining Who Is 
Disabled, 81 WIS. LAW. (2008), https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/
pages/article.aspx/archives/article.aspx?Volume=81&Issue=12&ArticleID=1634 [https://
perma.cc/FA5G-CP37]. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Murray, supra note 40 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002)). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2008)). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 The EEOC uses individualized assessments to determine if the individual 
suffers from a substantial disability based off objective factual evidence. Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(iv), (3) (2018). 
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only temporary.49 In order to uniform claims and prevent 
employment discrimination for disabled employees, Congress 
amended the ADA to address reasonable accommodations.50 
C. Safeguards for Reasonable Accommodations to Prevent 
Employment Discrimination 
Three specific provisions in the ADA govern employer 
methods for reasonably accommodating disabled employees.51 
Section 12112(a) of the ADA prohibits employers from 
discriminating against disabled individuals, who are otherwise 
qualified, when hiring or conducting other business-related 
procedures.52 To prevent employment discrimination and ensure 
compliance with the ADA, Section 12112(b)(5)(A) additionally 
requires employers to implement reasonable accommodations 
for disabled individuals unless it “would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business.” 53 Finally, Section 
12111(9)(B) defines what a reasonable accommodation for an 
employee entails and lists examples of what an employer may 
do, such as reassignment to a vacant position.54 
In order to prevent employment discrimination, the ADA 
provides the requisite foundation employers must comply with in 
order to reasonably accommodate their disabled employees.55 
Congress did not specify an exact method, but rather merely 
suggested some reasonable accommodations an employer may 
utilize.56 After the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court had to 
deal with whether filling an already occupied position based on a 
seniority system violated the ADA which then led to additional 
uncertainty amongst employers faced with the unanswered 
question of whether an employer had to reassign a disabled 
employee to a vacant position in violation of the employer’s 
seniority system.57 Due to the lack of clear direction from 
Congress, some employers have interpreted the provisions for  
 49 The ADA: Your Responsibilities as an Employer Addendum, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2008) https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6S3-8H4R]. 
 50 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)(B), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 51 Id. §§ 12111(9)(B), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). 
 52 Id. § 12112(a). 
 53 Id. § 12112 (b)(5)(A). 
 54 Id. § 12112(9)(B). “‘[R]easonable accommodation’ may include . . . reassignment 
to a vacant position.” Id. 
 55 Id. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A); see also U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 56 See infra Part II. 
 57 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391(2002); Huber v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting a split among circuits on the 
answer to this question). 
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reasonable accommodations as suggestions, rather than 
requirements, resulting in litigation.58 Consequently, circuit 
courts have been divided on the issue of reasonableness and 
whether it is contingent on specific factual circumstances.59 To 
clarify the ambiguity as to what reasonable accommodation 
entails and instances where reassignment may not be required, 
the Supreme Court in Barnett, attempted to create a workable 
standard to guide employers in the seniority system context.60 
II. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES REASONABLENESS IN 
U.S. AIRWAYS, INC., V. BARNETT 
In U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett, the Supreme Court 
infamously wrestled with the interpretation of Section 12101 of the 
ADA with respect to the narrow issue of employer seniority 
systems.61 Robert Barnett injured his back while on the job at U.S. 
Airways, and, because of his physical constraints, was relocated to a 
less laborious mailroom position.62 The mailroom position was 
subject to U.S. Airway’s seniority system whereby senior employees 
were allowed to bid on different positions within the company based 
on seniority.63 Barnett requested to maintain his mailroom position 
despite bids by more senior applicants as per a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA, but U.S. Airways refused due to his 
lack of ‘senior status’ within the company.64 As a result, the Supreme 
Court was forced to balance the interests presented between the 
workers with disabilities and the senior workers.65 Section 12112(a) 
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a disabled 
employee who can perform the essential functions of the job with 
“reasonable accommodation.”66 But Section 12112(a) is limited by 
Section 12112(b)(5) which rejects the reasonable accommodation if 
it “impose[s] an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.”67 
The primary issue the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether 
compliance with Title I of the ADA trumped U.S. Airway’s 
established seniority system in order to provide a reasonable 
accommodation to Barnett as a result of his back injury.68 
 
 58 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 59 See infra Part III. 
 60 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394. 
 61 Id. at 393. 
 62 Id. at 394. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 393–94. 
 66 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). 
 67 Id. § 12112(b)(5). 
 68 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94. 
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The Court declined to extend preferential treatment 
violating a disability-neutral rule69 as seniority systems are not 
per se unreasonable and accommodations that blatantly 
disregard them are ordinarily trumped.70 U.S. Airways argued 
that reasonably accommodating Barnett, and violating its 
seniority system, unfairly advantaged the disabled workers over 
more-senior workers who are not disabled.71 Describing U.S. 
Airways’ argument, Justice Breyer wrote, “[the requested 
accommodation violates a disability-neutral workplace rule, such 
as a seniority rule, [because] it grants the employee with a 
disability treatment that other workers could not receive. Yet the 
Act . . . [only seeks] ‘equal’ treatment for those with disabilities.”72 
The Court later dismissed this argument as not dispositive. It 
explained that accepting preferential treatment violating a well-
established seniority system would extend beyond the ADA’s 
intended coverage, creating a rights imbalance.73 The Court 
limited the scope of the ruling to suggest that affirmative conduct 
is sometimes needed to “promote entry of disabled people into the 
work force,”74 but seniority systems “ordinarily” are reasonable.75 
The only way a seniority system would not be reasonable, 
however, is if special circumstances exist, such as exceptions 
embedded within the seniority system that make the outright 
disregard of the accommodation unreasonable.76 Thus, a plaintiff 
may overcome the undue hardship standard through a rebuttable 
presumption by presenting evidence of the existence of special 
 
 69 Id. at 393–94. 
 70 Id. at 403. 
 71 Id. at 397. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 401. 
 75 Id. at 403. 
 76 Id. at 405 (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F.3d131, 137 (2d 
Cir. 1995)) (“[A]n accommodation that imposed burdens that would be unreasonable for 
most members of an industry might nevertheless be required of an individual defendant 
in light of that employer’s particular circumstances.”). 
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circumstances;77 otherwise, the direct violation of a seniority 
system “warrants summary judgment for the employer.”78 
The Court’s reasoning takes into account several 
factors.79 Principally, by supporting established employer 
systems, it strengthens the employer-employee relationship by 
ensuring uniform treatment amongst employees through 
objective standards.80 The logic behind this rule implies that an 
employee’s effort is contingent on their success and security 
within their job, established by obtaining a senior position. 
Historically, seniority systems have been in place for decades, 
and disregarding them would constitute an undue hardship to 
both the company and non-disabled employee.81 Additionally, 
there is a lack of congressional support suggesting the statute 
intended to destroy seniority systems to accommodate disabled 
employees.82 Hence, accommodations that violate seniority 
systems are ordinarily unreasonable.83 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in her concurrence, 
modified the Court’s test by requiring an analysis of the legal 
enforceability of the seniority system.84 She addressed the 
reasonable accommodation of “reassignment to a vacant position” 
and asserted that the seniority system would be unreasonable if 
it “prevents the position in question from being vacant.”85 “Indeed, 
the legislative history of the Act confirms that Congress did not 
intend reasonable accommodation[s] to require . . . ‘bumping’ 
another employee out of a position. . . .”86 O’Connor projected that 
an equitable remedy should not impose hardships on other 
 
 77 Id. at 405–06. 
The plaintiff (here the employee) nonetheless remains free to show that special 
circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority 
system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the requested 
“accommodation” is “reasonable” on the particular facts. . . . The plaintiff 
might show, for example, that the employer, having retained the right to 
change the seniority system unilaterally, exercises that right fairly frequently, 
reducing employee expectations that the system will be followed—to the point 
where one more departure, needed to accommodate an individual with a 
disability, will not likely make a difference. The plaintiff might show that the 
system already contains exceptions such that, in the circumstances, one 
further exception is unlikely to matter. We do not mean these examples to 
exhaust the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make. 
Id. at 405 (citations omitted). 
 78 Id. at 406. 
 79 Id. at 403–05. 
 80 Id. at 393. 
 81 Id. at 395. 
 82 Id. at 405. 
 83 Id. at 405–06. 
 84 Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 85 Id. at 408–09 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994)). 
 86 Id. at 410 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990)). 
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employees, and if the position is by definition occupied, 
reassignment to that position by definition cannot be warranted.87 
Although O’Connor employed a different analysis than the 
majority opinion, she agreed with the Court’s outcome.88 
On the other hand, the dissent argued the Court’s opinion 
is defective because the accommodation of “reassignment to a 
vacant position” would be rendered meaningless under the ADA if 
“the disabled employee [was only] considered for a vacant 
position.”89 Because the ADA’s purpose is to prohibit discrimination 
with respect to hiring, it follows that “a disabled employee must be 
given preference over a non-disabled employee when a vacant 
position appears.”90 In accordance with the goals and purpose of 
the ADA, reassignment to a vacant position is a necessary 
accommodation because it abolishes the impediments “arising 
solely from the disability.”91 The dissent qualified this argument 
by limiting its conclusion to guaranteeing a disabled applicant 
reassignment to a vacant position only if no one else is seeking 
the position, or if a more qualified applicant exists, the position 
will not be granted automatically.92 
The dissent also critiqued the rebuttable presumption, 
which allows employees to demonstrate special circumstances to 
overcome a seniority system preference.93 The aforementioned 
framework is too ambiguous as there is no exact criterion to 
show “departure from seniority rules [are] ‘not likely to make a 
difference.’”94 In sum, this standard gives disabled employees a 
“vague and unspecified power . . . to undercut bona fide 
[seniority] systems”95 which is inherently unclear and forms the 
basis for litigation.96 Evidently, uncertainty exists as to what 
special circumstances overcome a seniority system and how this 
opinion extends to other situations outside of established 
seniority systems. Justice Souter’s dissent contended that a 
holistic approach must be utilized to determine if reassignment 
to a vacant position qualifies as a reasonable accommodation.97 
After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling, circuit courts, 
 
 87 Id. at 410–11. 
 88 Id. at 411. 
 89 Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). 
 90 Id. at 414. 
 91 Id. at 415. 
 92 Id. at 416. 
 93 Id. at 418. “I have no idea what this [standard] means.” Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 419. 
 96 Id. at 420. 
 97 Id. at 422–23. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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next, had to rule on whether reassignment to a vacant position 
was mandatory as a reasonable accommodation. 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT OR NOT? 
Although Barnett attempted to resolve the ambiguity 
regarding reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable 
accommodation, circuit courts are still split on the issue of whether 
reassignment to a vacant position is a mandatory 
accommodation.98 The Supreme Court did not address the issue of 
whether reassignment to a vacant position is a mandatory 
reasonable accommodation, but rather only whether reassignment 
to a vacant position suffices as a reasonable accommodation with 
respect to seniority systems in a disability-neutral system.99 Thus, 
the Supreme Court insufficiently resolved the ambiguity by failing 
to render a decision as to whether the ADA mandates 
noncompetitive reassignment. “By importing a reasonableness 
standard without definition, the Supreme Court create[d], rather 
than eliminate[d] or reduce[d], uncertainty in the ADA about when 
accommodations are required.”100 To demonstrate this divisive 
issue, circuit courts have adopted the “best-qualified applicant” 
approach as an extension of Barnett’s narrow ruling. 
A. “Best-Qualified Applicant” Approach 
1. “The ADA Is Not an Affirmative Action Statute”101 
In Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Pam Huber suffered “a 
permanent injury to her right arm and hand” while working for 
the defendant corporation, Wal-Mart.102 Because of this, Huber 
requested “as a reasonable accommodation, reassignment to a 
router position.”103 Although Huber was qualified, Wal-Mart 
declined to extend an offer to Huber, as “she was not the most 
qualified applicant.”104 The issue was whether the ADA required 
Wal-Mart to, as a reasonable accommodation, give Huber 
preference in the general applicant pool where she was able to 
perform the duties but not the most qualified candidate.105 
 
 98 Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 99 See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (majority opinion). 
 100 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10. 
 101 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 102 Id. at 481. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that “the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and 
does not require an employer to [mandatorily] reassign a qualified 
disabled employee to a vacant position” in violation of a legitimate 
best-qualified applicant policy.106 Thus, the ADA does not 
mandate reassigning a disabled employee to a position filled by a 
higher-ranking applicant.107 The Eighth Circuit correctly 
rendered a decision, as the ADA does not require an employer to 
do any more for a disabled employee than level the playing field.108 
Since the disabled employee was qualified for the position, and 
would be whether she maintained a disability or not, the ADA was 
of no use in this particular circumstance and thus mandatory 
reassignment was not justified. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
ruled on a similar question in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.109 
In Turco, John Turco worked as a chemical operator for thirteen 
years at Hoescht Celanese Chemical Group, Inc.110 During his 
employment, he developed adult onset diabetes but still remained 
a competent worker.111 As per physician recommendation, and 
due to his worsening condition, Turco applied for a technician 
position but was not selected.112 As a result, Turco argued Hoechst 
did not provide a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA 
that resulted in unlawful discrimination based on his disability.113 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
considered Hoechst’s compliance with the ADA for reasonably 
accommodating Turco and concluded Turco lacked the 
qualifications of the essential functions of a chemical operator and 
a technician position alike.114 The court ruled that “the [ADA] does 
not require affirmative action in favor of individuals with 
disabilities. It merely prohibits employment discrimination against 
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.”115 
Here, Turco was not even qualified for the position, so mandating 
reassignment to a vacant position would have undermined the 
goals of the ADA and violated the Supreme Court’s standards by 
creating an undue hardship on the employer.116 While the Eighth  
 106 Id. at 483; Meneghello, supra note 2. 
 107 Huber, 486 F.3d. at 484. 
 108 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012)). 
 109 Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1093. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1094 (citing Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 116 Id. see also US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 416 (2002). 
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and Fifth circuits noted that the ADA was not an affirmative action 
statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit looked into whether the best-qualified applicant policy 
could be judged as equivalent to a seniority system. 
2. The Best-Qualified Applicant Policy Is Synonymous 
with Seniority Systems 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit rendered the most recent decision regarding the 
reasonable accommodation provision pursuant to the ADA. In 
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 
Leokadia Bryk, “a nurse in the psychiatric ward of St. Joseph’s 
Hospital,” developed spinal stenosis and arthritis, necessitating 
the use of a cane.117 Bryk’s cane usage raised concerns with 
performing her job, as it would pose a safety hazard if the 
psychiatric patients attempted to use the cane as a weapon.118 
The hospital allowed Bryk to apply to other positions within the 
Hospital, despite Bryk’s limited qualifications for other 
positions.119 Additionally, “the Hospital allowed Bryk to compete 
with other internal candidates,” rather than the general pool of 
applicants.120 The principal issue considered was whether the 
ADA mandates noncompetitive reassignment.121 
The Eleventh Circuit attempted to extend the Barnett 
framework to guide the analysis, stating that the ADA does not 
ordinarily require reassignment if it violates an employer 
seniority system, unless a plaintiff can present evidence of special 
circumstances.122 This framework, however, did not specifically 
cater to the facts of St. Joseph’s Hosp., as it involved a best-
qualified applicant policy rather than a seniority system.123 Here, 
the court equated the employer’s best-qualified hiring policy with 
a seniority system to argue that mandating reassignment would 
not be reasonable.124 This justification suggested that the decision 
rendered in Barnett extends beyond the scope of seniority systems 
and can be extrapolated to all similar decisions.125 
 
 117 EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 118 Id. at 1338. 
 119 Id. The hospital also waived two requirements which normally applied to 
internal candidates for transfer: (1) that the candidate be in his or her current position for at 
least six months; and (2) that no final written warnings exist in the candidate’s record. Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1345. 
 122 Id. at 1346 (citing U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002)). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
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The court rationalized that disregarding a best-qualified 
hiring policy would “impose[ ]  substantial costs on the hospital 
and potentially on patients.”126 This is mainly because “employers 
operate their businesses for profit, which requires efficiency and 
good performance,”127 so automatically reassigning a less-
qualified employee would undermine employer’s goals, especially 
in a hospital setting.128 
Ultimately, the court found that “the ADA does not 
require reassignment without competition for, or preferential 
treatment of [people with] disab[ilities].”129 The court construed 
the ADA generally to mean employers must reasonably 
accommodate their disabled employees, but did not specify the 
exact method for doing so.130 The use of the word “may”131 in the 
ADA’s non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations 
implied that reassignment to a vacant position can be 
reasonable, but it is not always reasonable.132 The argument 
suggests that because Congress failed to use binding language, 
the intent for reassignment as a mandatory reasonable 
accommodation does not comport with Congress’ intent.133 The 
court interpreted the ADA to only require a disabled employee 
to equally compete in the general applicant pool, not to create 
additional challenges for the non-disabled employees.134 The 
impact of this decision adds to the split with other circuit courts’ 
rulings contending that reassignment is mandatory. 
B. Reassignment Is Mandatory 
1. The Tenth Circuit Interpreted the ADA’s Language 
as Mandatory 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
issued the first opinion interpreting reassignment to a vacant 
position to be a mandatory reasonable accommodation. In Smith 
v. Midland Brake, Inc., Robert Smith worked as an employee for 
seven years at Midland Brake.135 Smith’s job required him to test 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. (citing May, MERRIAM-WEBSTER www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/may) 
[https://perma.cc/6YPG-65J6]. 
 132 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(9)(B) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may 
include . . . reassignment to vacant position.” (emphasis added)). 
 133 Id. at 1345 n.5. 
 134 Id. at 1346. 
 135 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
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air brakes for large vehicles, sometimes exposing him to 
irritants and chemicals.136 As a result of his position, Smith 
developed severe chronic dermatitis that prevented him from 
working for periods of time.137 As per Smith’s physical 
limitations, Smith was unable to perform and qualify for any of 
the positions Midland Brake had to offer.138 Consequently, 
Midland Brake declined to reassign Smith to a vacant position 
within the company as a reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.139 Midland Brake justified its decision by arguing that 
Smith did not fall under the definition of a disabled individual 
because Smith was not an otherwise qualified individual who 
could perform the essential functions of any position.140 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had to first 
address if Smith still met the definition of a qualified individual 
under the ADA although he was unable to perform the essential 
requirements of his position and, if so, whether Midland Brake 
failed to reasonably accommodate Smith. 
The court did not preclude Smith’s ADA claim for an 
accommodation of reassignment based on Midland’s argument 
that Smith did not meet the definition of a qualified individual.141 
The court reasoned that in order to give the reassignment 
requirement under the ADA teeth it “must mean something 
more than merely allowing a disabled person to compete equally 
with the rest of the world for a vacant position.”142 The Tenth 
Circuit noted that the language used by other circuits in 
interpreting the ADA’s reassignment provision “is 
instructive.”143 In other words, reassignment is listed as a 
reasonable accommodation because otherwise firing an 
employee due to his disabling limitations would be “no 
accommodation at all”144 and would function as discriminatory.145 
Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, reassignment means 
automatically giving a position to a qualified employee with a 
disability regardless of the more qualified applicant pool.146 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 1161. “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(8) (2012). 
 141 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1167. 
 142 Id. at 1165. 
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 144 Ransom v. State of Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 902–03 (D.Ariz.1997). 
 145 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164–65. 
 146 Id. at 1167; Meneghello, supra note 2. 
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2. The D.C. Circuit Arrives at Mandatory Reassignment 
Through an Unclear Standard 
In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, Etim Aka had a job 
that “required a substantial amount of heavy lifting and 
pushing.”147 As a result of heart and circulatory problems, Aka 
underwent bypass surgery, involving a rehabilitation period 
during which he could not perform the functions of the job.148 
Washington Hospital Center’s policy outlined that former 
hospital employees would be considered preferentially in the 
applicant pool over nonhospital employees, as a collective 
bargaining agreement.149 As Aka applied for jobs, he did not 
receive any interviews.150 Washington Hospital Center contended 
that because Aka was no longer a qualified applicant due to his 
physical limitations, he did not fall within the limits of section 
12112(b)(5)(A), and were therefore not required to reassign him.151 
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit rejected Washington Hospital Center’s 
contention that Aka was ineligible for reassignment as a means of 
reasonable accommodation.152 The court considered a multitude of 
arguments but failed to state the boundaries of compliance by 
skirting the issue.153 Specifically, the court “decline[d] to decide the 
precise contours of an employer’s reassignment obligations” by 
listing many reasons but no unified standard.154 Thus, it is unclear 
what exact standard the D.C. Circuit adopted, but it rejected the 
dissenting opinion that defined reassignment as simply submitting 
an application to the general applicant pool.155 
Overall, circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether 
mandatory reassignment is always a reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA and whether mandatory reassignment should be 
extrapolated outside of the seniority system realm.156 Some 
employers endorse the “best-qualified applicant” approach, 
without running afoul of the ADA that proposes disabled 
employees are required to compete in the application process and 
should not be given priority over more qualified applicants due to 
 
 147 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 1286–87. 
 150 Id. at 1287. 
 151 Id. at 1300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1994)). 
 152 Id. at 1305. 
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 154 Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305. 
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their disability status.157 However, other circuit courts and the 
EEOC endorse the proposition that reassignment is always 
mandatory, regardless of the disabled employee being the most 
qualified.158 Such a split must be resolved as the uncertainty 
created by the split negatively impacts an employer’s ability to 
comply with the law and the legal rights of workers. 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IMPACTS EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE AND 
WORKERS RIGHTS WITH THE ADA 
Perhaps the most pervasive problem of the split directly 
impacts employer’s compliance with the ADA.159 Because employers 
operate for profit, eliminating mandatory reassignment is an 
appealing standard to follow, although the standard may not be 
lawful.160 Even if an employer errs on the side of the EEOC’s 
interpretation, the EEOC website is silent as to whether a disabled 
employee should be given preferential treatment in a general 
applicant pool, as was rejected by the Eighth Circuit.161 The EEOC 
only contends that an employer must consider reassigning the 
disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation.162 The ambiguity 
surrounding this provision creates issues with compliance, leaving 
employers in the dark and subject to litigation.163 By the same token, 
lacking a uniform standard “may . . . create unnecessary confusion 
and encourage forum shopping or vigorous jurisdiction-based legal 
battles.”164 Additionally, it is more appealing for employers to select 
the more qualified applicant over a less-qualified disabled applicant 
for purposes of efficiency and effectiveness.165 This inherently forces 
employers to make uninformed business decisions and “adopt 
inconsistent reassignment policies.”166 
Additionally, the circuit split impacts the rights of workers 
with disabilities under the ADA. Disabled employees will either 
be mandatorily reassigned or subject to competitive reassignment 
solely contingent on the employer’s choice. Disabled workers’ 
rights are also contingent on their physical geographical location 
that may afford them more or less rights than other disabled 
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workers.167 Even if disabled workers are automatically reassigned 
without meeting the necessary qualifications, their coworkers 
may harbor resentment and ostracize the employee.168 Thus, 
disabled employees do not have a concrete standard to determine 
if their rights are actually being violated. Moreover, disabled 
employees are at an inherent disadvantage when suing deep-
pocketed employers as litigation costs are expensive, and if the 
suit is unnecessary, resources will be wasted.169 
Overall, the ADA’s goals are rendered meaningless and 
cannot be achieved if employers are not complying with a 
uniform interpretation. Without a consistent and uniform 
standard, employers are incentivized to do the exact opposite of 
what the ADA purports to achieve.170 Employers will avoid hiring 
disabled applicants because of the unpredictable adherence 
consequences and the exorbitant cost associated with such 
ambiguity.171 These types of decisions force employers to make 
discretionary value decisions that “elevate[ ]  workplace norms 
over individualized assessments.”172 This can undermine 
disabled employee’s rights because employers are allowed to 
prioritize employer policies over individual’s rights and the 
ADA’s goals via their own discretion.173 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court may correct for this lack of uniformity that may 
resolve this discretionary decision once and for all. 
V. HOW AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE 
THE SPLIT 
A. “Best-Qualified Applicant” Approach: Interpreting 
Reassignment Is Not Mandatory 
Although many critiques argue that competitive 
reassignment would render the ADA meaningless, employing a 
non-competitive reassignment would actually render the act moot 
by discriminating against the most-qualified applicant just 
because the applicant does not maintain a disability that would 
automatically guarantee the position. In order to create a 
consistent standard, the Supreme Court must step in and clarify 
the law. Implications from Barnett suggest that the Court’s 
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reasonableness standard extends to guide “outside of the seniority 
context.”174 This previous standard suggests that once an 
accommodation is judged to be reasonable it is automatically 
mandatory. The Supreme Court seems to unanimously agree, 
based on the majority and minority opinions, that the ADA should 
only eliminate the impediments created by the disability.175 In 
fact, the dissenters justified their position that a disabled 
applicant should not automatically be guaranteed the position if 
a more qualified applicant exists because of the inequality this 
preferential treatment creates amongst equally qualified, if not 
more-qualified, applicants.176 
B. Two-Prong Test Solution 
If the Supreme Court should take up the case, instead of 
using the “reasonable[ness] in the run of cases”177 framework, the 
Court should implement a two-prong test178: (1) the qualification 
of the applicant; and (2) a cost-benefit analysis that will outline 
some of the factors that the Court should consider. The purpose 
and usefulness of this test will address all circuit court 
contentions and ensure a fair outcome for both employers and 
disabled applicants, creating an amicable solution. Moreover, the 
solution comports with the ADA and incentives of both parties. In 
order to meet the test, a qualified applicant meets the first prong 
and satisfies the test, however, not being qualified fails the first 
prong and sends the applicant to the second prong. 
For the first prong, the Court should consider if the 
applicant is capable of performing the essential functions of and is 
qualified for the position or, for that matter, any positions within 
the company at all. If the answer is “yes,” then the disabled 
employee should be considered within the general applicant pool 
and the inquiry ends there. Because reasonable accommodation 
refers to any accommodation, the disabled employee “may need in 
order to have an equal opportunity to succeed in the employment 
position,”179 allowing preferential treatment of a disabled applicant 
 
 174 Id. at 10; see also U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002). 
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is unnecessary as the disabled applicant already possesses the 
necessary qualifications to succeed at the employment position. 
Similar to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Huber,180 
reassignment is not mandatory simply because the applicant 
was qualified for the position. Both the majority and minority 
opinions agree in Barnett that mandating workers with 
disabilities to automatically get the position over another 
applicant is not permissible.181 Even without the ADA’s 
existence, the disabled employee still has the opportunity to 
compete for the job, and the disabled employee is not at a 
disadvantage due to his disability. Allowing a disabled worker 
to have preferential treatment over another qualified applicant 
undermines democracy and disregards the goals of the ADA, 
such as equality.182 Thus, if the disabled employee is qualified for 
the position, the inquiry should end there because inevitably 
there will be someone more qualified for a position, regardless of 
a disability, and preferential treatment would disrupt the 
balance of rights all applicants are entitled to. 
If the answer to the question whether the disabled 
employee meets the ADA Statutory and Regulatory definition of 
“qualified” for a position in the company is “no,” then the disabled 
employee should be considered in the internal applicant pool 
instead, similar to the process employed by the Eleventh Circuit.183 
An internal applicant pool will already advantage the disabled 
employee over the general applicant pool and bypass some 
individuals who are more qualified for the position.184 The internal 
applicant pool will leverage the disabled employee over many other 
individuals, although the applicant may not even be fully qualified 
for the position. If the disabled employee is the only applicant 
within the internal applicant pool, the disabled employee should 
acquire the position, ensuring that the employer meets the ADA 
requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation for the 
employee, given the employer exhausted all other forms of 
 
 180 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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reasonable accommodations. The justification for this lies in the 
interpretation of the ADA and the fact that the disability would be 
the sole impediment to employment. If the disabled employee is not 
qualified, the employee fails the first prong, then the decision for 
reassignment becomes contingent on the second prong that is 
analyzed under a cost-benefit analysis. 
The second prong should analyze the rights of both the 
employer and the disabled employee by using a cost-benefit 
analysis. This assessment will largely be implemented on a case-
by-case basis, but the Court’s consistent analysis will create the 
desired goal of a uniform interpretation. By analyzing each unique 
case in a consistent way, the Court will formulaically achieve its 
desired goal of uniformity. If the individual is not qualified for the 
position, but because of their disability will permanently disqualify 
the applicant from the position, the applicant should be considered 
by undergoing a cost-benefit analysis that analyzes the applicant’s 
specific circumstances. 
Different than the rebuttable presumption laid out in 
Barnett185 this analysis should determine the undue hardship to 
the employer considering factors such as: (1) severity of the 
disability; and (2) the impact of disability on the employer. For 
instance, if the disabled employee is not qualified for the position 
because he is one-year shy of experience, the cost to the employer 
is not severe because the employee can presumably still perform 
basic functions. On the other hand, if the disabled employee is 
across the board not qualified and cannot perform the basic 
functions of the position then the cost would be overwhelming to 
the employer, akin to an undue hardship.186 Here, the rights of the 
employer matter greatly as his primary goal is to hire based on 
efficiency and potential profit.187 Thus, the hardship a non-
qualified disabled employee would have on the employer should 
factor into the Court’s analysis.188 
The analysis should also be done through the lens of the 
disabled employee as well by considering factors such as: (1) 
opportunity for future employment; (2) contribution to the 
company;189 and (3) special circumstances.190 If the disabled 
employee has no opportunity for future employment because of the 
 
 185 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405. 
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impediment imposed by the disability, then the employer must 
take into consideration his reassignment as mandatory if no other 
method could accommodate the individual. This is different than a 
substantial limitation analysis because although the individual 
may qualify as disabled, the disability may not limit him from 
every possible position within the company, but rather a broad 
spectrum of positions.191 If the individual was an asset to the 
company and contributed positively for many years but his 
disability manifested later in life, preventing him from completing 
the required tasks of his job, the employer should consider 
preferential reassignment. Also, if the disabled employee 
developed the disability as part of his job, the employer should give 
preferential reassignment more weight, considering the employer 
was the proximate cause of the disability. Thus, the decision for 
reassignment is not per se mandatory, but rather contingent on the 
Court’s consistent analysis and final judgment call considering the 
factors through each party’s lens. 
C. Potential Problems 
The two-prong test may have its costs such as 
contradicting previous EEOC rulings or permanently ending the 
claim that the ADA is an affirmative action statute. Regarding 
the first prong which considers the qualifications of the disabled 
employee, critics may argue that this prong is in direct conflict 
with the EEOC’s framework as well as the decisions by the 
Tenth and D.C. Circuits.192 These commentators may interpret 
the ADA as affording additional safeguards to those employees 
with disabilities because without them, a disabled employee’s 
position in society would be neutral, which undermines the 
purpose of the ADA.193 Even if these disabled employees are 
qualified for the position, disabled employees deserve additional 
measures to ensure equality. 
In response to these criticisms, I argue that the exact 
opposite goal will be achieved, because highlighting disabled 
employees in society and advantaging these individuals over 
other applicants simply due to a diagnosis overlooks the ability 
and performance of a disabled employee. The internal applicant 
pool solution may create difficulties with compliance as well. 
Critics may argue that an internal applicant pool is akin to the 
general applicant pool because, although the pool is narrower, 
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the position is not guaranteed. In response, an internal 
applicant pool administers just enough of an advantage to 
these disabled employees. By striking the right balance of 
leverage over outside applicants, the internal applicant pool 
suffices as a nondiscriminatory mechanism of preferential 
treatment, appeasing both sides of the contentious debate. 
The second prong of the test that outlines a cost-benefit 
analysis from both perspectives may attract criticism as well. 
Critics may contest the employer’s cost-benefit analysis suggesting 
the ADA was created for disabled employees and not employers. 
Additionally, the cost-benefit analysis may not yield consistent 
results, which impacts compliance for future decisions by creating 
uncertainty. In response, the formulaic method outlined in the two-
prong test methodically analyzes each case in the same way and 
ensures consistent weight be given to different factors present in 
each situation, considering undue hardship and special 
circumstance standards alike. As such, there will always be 
critiques of any proposed solution, but the two-prong test creates, 
on balance, an amicable solution to both sides of the debate. 
D. Current Solution 
In the unlikely event the Supreme Court never faces this 
issue, employers should follow a qualified standard argued but not 
adopted in Barnett, suggesting that all disability-neutral rules, not 
just seniority systems, should trump mandatory reassignment 
positions.194 Although circuit courts are divided on its 
interpretation, the standard elicited through a combination of the 
majority and minority opinions can be combined to create a holistic 
approach to bind all circuit courts’ interpretations that have not yet 
addressed the issue.195 The Court considered a holistic approach 
that can be extrapolated from the majority and dissenting opinion 
suggesting that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the 
existence of a seniority system should only be a factor in the 
analysis.196 As a result, courts should consider a company’s hiring 
system as a factor in the reasonable accommodation analysis. If the 
hiring system is disability-neutral, courts should weigh in favor of 
that system unless presented with “special circumstances.”197 The 
majority and minority opinions indicate that mandatory 
reassignment is not always reasonable,198 and thus circuit courts 
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should not disregard the best-qualified applicant in their hiring 
procedures. Therefore, circuit courts should not extend preferential 
treatment to disabled employees merely because he is disabled but 
rather consider factors such as undue hardship and special 
circumstances within their analysis as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The best-qualified applicant method analyzed under a 
two-prong test should govern future decisions regarding 
mandatory reassignment because the ADA’s definition of 
reassignment is unclear and subject to varying interpretations. 
The statute’s definition that a “‘reasonable accommodation’ may 
include . . . reassignment to vacant position”199 created a circuit 
split and confusion over whether reassignment is always 
reasonable.200 Some circuits have held that reassignment is 
always a reasonable accommodation and thus should be 
interpreted as mandatory.201 This approach suggests that 
employers should bypass the best-qualified applicant in order to 
give preferential treatment to their disabled employees. Other 
circuit courts contend that reassignment should not be 
interpreted as a mandatory reasonable accommodation.202 This 
approach emphasizes that a disabled applicant should not be 
given preferential treatment over a more qualified applicant due 
to their disability status.203 
Despite the Court addressing a similar issue with 
seniority systems in Barnett204 the framework established does 
not clarify the Court’s position outside of the seniority system 
realm.205 The framework only resolves cases when an employer is 
faced with a disability-neutral rule and suggests that mandatory 
reassignment would not be reasonable in these types of cases.206 
The Court, however, failed to address cases where there is a lack 
of a disability-neutral rule. The Court’s justifications seem to 
suggest that if the Court were to take up a case without a 
disability-neutral rule, it would rule the same way and decline to 
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extend preferential treatment to a disabled applicant who is not 
the best-qualified applicant.207 
The Eleventh Circuit said it best: mandatory 
reassignment for disabled employees turns “nondiscrimination 
into discrimination.”208 As such, circuit courts should not require 
mandatory reassignment as a method of preferential treatment 
for disabled employees but rather assess the best-qualified 
applicant method utilized by employers under a two-prong test. 
This solution appeases both the employers’ and the EEOC’s 
contentions and concerns regarding compliance with the ADA. 
The two-prong test solves the issue by ensuring equality as well 
as adding some weight to disabled employee applicants if 
absolutely necessary. The two-prong test serves as a compromise 
between two competing interests and ensures an amicable 
solution. In order for employers to comply with the ADA, the 
Court must take a case to resolve the dispute and create a 
unifying standard by adopting the two-prong test. 
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